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This paper assesses the importance of non-pecuniary factors on tax compliance in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). In addition, the paper examines how legal origins affect tax 
compliance factors. Using the Round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey data across 29 countries, 
the findings revealed that non-pecuniary factors in the form of tax knowledge limitation; non-
compliance by others; and corruption of tax officials are associated with reductions in the 
probability of tax compliance in SSA. On the contrary, factors such as trust in tax 
department; handling the provision of health, education and road needs, tend to be associated 
with increase the probability of complying with tax laws and obligations in SSA. In terms of 
legal origins, institutions and fiscal exchange have bigger association with compliance for 
common law countries (British origin) and civil law countries (French origin) respectively.  
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Although an increase in revenue collection effort through a well-functioning tax system is 
necessary to create fiscal space, provide essential public services, reduce foreign aid and 
single resource dependence, the domestic tax bases in most African countries are undermined 
by widespread tax avoidance and evasion (IMF 2011). Moreover, Schneider et al. (2010) 
estimated the shadow economy in sub-Saharan Africa to be 40.2%. High tax compliance is 
therefore necessary for efficiency and equity as well as for the development of social capital 
(see Slemrod, 1998). The reason is that while reducing tax evasion improves the 
government’s revenue, it is also a broader issue for the development of a civil order (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997).  
 
Taxpayers’ behaviour is such that they are not willing to comply with tax laws when given 
the opportunity. That notwithstanding, if we consider the benefit that could be obtained with 
evading taxes, then what influences individuals to comply with tax obligations becomes a 
question worthy of consideration. In this regard, understanding the attitude of taxpayers with 
respect to factors that affect their compliance and how to influence these factors would 
obviously be very essential to enhancing revenue generation for economic growth and 
development. The objective of this paper therefore is to assess the importance of non-
pecuniary factors on tax compliance in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
 
There are policies such as high penalty rate and increasing inspection by tax officials in SSA. 
Yet this is not reflecting in high compliance (less tax evasion and avoidance). Also, judging 
from the fact that the conventional deterrence theory in evidence has not always encouraged 
compliance (see Fatás & Roig, 2004), it becomes necessary to assess the role played by non-
pecuniary factors in in shaping and improving tax compliance. Non-pecuniary factors refer to 
factors that are not determined by rational cost-benefit considerations as argued by the 
deterrence theory of tax compliance (see Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), which may include 
tax knowledge, institutions, fiscal exchange among others. Such evidence will provide the 
core basis for reforming institutions and the tax system. This will then have the potential of 
reducing compliance cost, improving tax administration, and accountability of public 
officials, and hence reduces non-compliance.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature on tax compliance in SSA in two stances. First, it 
employs data based on recent individual-level survey to analyse the importance of non-
pecuniary factors on tax compliance in SSA. Second, it fills the literature gap by looking at  
whether legal origins (British common law and French civil law) have association with 
compliance factors. This is because, with regards to legal origins, the legal framework in a 
country affects attitude and how businesses are conducted and therefore how compliant 
people are to tax regulations.  
 
By employing the Probit estimation method and controlling for individual, location and 
country characteristics, the paper revealed that non-pecuniary factors in the form of tax 
knowledge limitation; non-compliance by others; and corruption of tax officials are 
associated with reductions in the probability of tax compliance in SSA. On the contrary, 
factors such as trust in tax department; handling the provision of health, education and road 
needs, tend to be associated with increase the probability of complying with tax laws and 
obligations in SSA. In terms of legal origins, institutions and fiscal exchange have bigger 
association with compliance for common law countries (British origin) and civil law 
countries (French origin) respectively. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents stylised facts on tax revenue, 
tax effort and shadow economy in sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 deals with the literature 
review on tax compliance. The baseline model, empirical strategy and data sources are laid 
out in Section 4. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 5. Section 6 
presents robustness checks and section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Stylised Facts on Tax Revenue, Tax Efforts and Shadow Economy in SSA 
Tax revenue/GDP has not been sustained on an upward level although there have been many 
policy measures put in place to boost revenue generation. The ratio of tax revenue to GDP in 
SSA stood at 14.32% by end of 2003. This figure improved by the end of 2004 to 14.81%. 
This was sustained and further improved to 17.95% by the end of 2008. Thereafter, 
sustenance has been a major problem as the ratio has been dropping on a whole and reaching 
as low as 15.79% by the end of 2013 as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Tax revenue/GDP in SSA 
One possible explanation is attributed to tax evasion. According to Global Financial Integrity 
estimates, Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from the biggest loss in terms of tax evasion (Kar and 
LeBlanc, 2013). The ability to increase tax revenue to a large extent depends on tax effort. 
Tax effort is the index of the ratio between the share of the actual tax collection to GDP and 
the predicted taxable capacity (Stotsky, et al., 1997). In this case, “high tax effort” is when 
the ratio is greater than one (1) - meaning that the country utilizes its tax base very well in 
order to increase tax revenues. A “low tax effort” is when the ratio is less than one (1) – 
meaning that the country may have relatively substantial scope or potential to raise tax 
revenues. For Sub-Saharan Africa, Fenochietto and Pessino (2013) estimated a tax effort of 
0.71. It must be noted that majority of countries even had tax effort less than the average of 
0.71 as displayed in Figure 2. Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria had the lowest of tax efforts of 0.33 
and 0.39 respectively. Few countries came close to the achieving tax effort of 1. These 
include Mozambique (0.85), Namibia (0.91), Malawi (0.98) and Zambia (0.98).  
 
It is clear from the Figure 2 that tax revenue generation in SSA is below its potential. A 
plausible reason that can be given is either low compliance or non-compliance. To support 
this claim is Schnieder at al., (2010) who estimated the shadow economy as a ratio of GDP 
for SSA from 1999 – 2007 to be 40.2%. Estimate for countries is illustrated in Figure 3. The 
estimates illustrated depict a high level of shadow economy across SSA with the exception of 
few countries whose estimates are less than world’s average of 33%. These countries include 
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such as Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe had the worst in terms of estimates with shadow 
economy estimates of 56.4%, 56.2% and 61.8% respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2. Tax effort in selected countries in SSA 
 
 
Figure 3. Shadow economy across Sub-Saharan countries 
 
Thus the important question that arises from the above analysis is, how can tax compliance be 
improved in SSA? It is for this reason that this paper seeks to assess the importance of non-
pecuniary factors on tax compliance in SSA. 
 
3. Review of Related Literature 
Tax compliance is a major problem for many tax authorities and it is not an easy task to 
persuade taxpayers to comply with tax requirements even though ‘tax laws are not always 
precise’ (James and Alley, 2004). Tax compliance is probably the most neutral term for 
describing the willingness of the taxpayer to pay taxes (Kirchler 2007). Essentially it means 
that the person declares voluntarily and pays in a timely manner all tax liabilities and along 
with all these, accounting for taxation purposes shall be in compliance with the valid norms 
pursuant to the tax law (OECD 2008).  
 
The benchmark economic model of tax evasion over the last half century has been the 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, in which self -interested taxpayers choose how much 
income to report to the tax authority by trading off the benefits of evasion (lower tax 
payments) against the costs of evasion (the possibility of being caught and punished). The 
key policy parameters affecting tax evasion and compliance to that effect are tax rate, the 
detection probability, and the penalty imposed conditional on the evasion being detected. 
However, there is an apparent disconnect between much of the academic literature on tax 
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compliance and the administration of tax policy (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). While tax 
administrators are obviously concerned about enforcement, they also tend to place a great 
deal of emphasis on improving “tax morale,” by which they generally mean increasing 
voluntary compliance with tax laws and creating a social norm of compliance.  
 
Torgler and Schneider (2007) argue that values and attitudes can affect individual behaviour. 
Apart from sanctions, Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) argued that a set of attitudes and norms 
might have effect on the choice between tax compliance and evasion. Lewis (1982) points out 
that “it could be that tax evasion is the only channel through which taxpayers can express 
their antipathy … we can be confident in our general prediction that if tax attitudes become 
worse, tax evasion will increase”. Therefore, we can state that values and attitudes can affect 
individual’s behaviour and hence compliance. Individuals consider tax evasion (non-
compliance) to be a less serious wrongdoing the more widespread they presume it to be (Frey 
and Torgler, 2007). In line with this, tax compliance is said to be affected by tax morale; with 
the later been seen as an internalized social norm for the former (Elster, 1989). Specifically, 
as in Gordon (1989) and Traxler (2010), the strength of the norm depends on an individual 
specific degree of norm internalization and the endogenously determined share of evaders in 
the economy (with a higher share inducing a weaker norm). Hence, individual evasion 
decisions depend on the behaviour of others implying that individuals act conditionally 
cooperative (Gaechter, 2006).  
 
The influence of knowledge on tax compliance behaviour has been proven in various 
research (see Mohamad Ali et. al., 2007; Singh, 2003; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Harris, 1989 
etc). According to Eriksen and Fallan, (1996), the level of education received by taxpayers is 
an important factor that contributes to the general understanding about taxation especially 
regarding the laws and regulations of taxation and hence their ability to comply with them. 
Also, studies on the relationship between the specifics of actual government spending and tax 
compliance, particularly on tax evasion, are very limited (Palil and Ahmad, 2011). According 
to them, logically, taxpayers, and especially those who pay high amounts of tax, will be 
sensitive to what the government spends their money on. Although there is limited empirical 
evidence, it is reasonable to assume that taxpayers will tend to evade tax and for that matter, 
will not comply to tax if they perceive that the government spends tax money unwisely. 
 
It must be noted that institutions that respect the preferences of the citizens will have more 
support by the people than a state that acts as a Leviathan (see Prinz, 2010). Such a 
supportive behaviour has a positive effect on compliance. Levi (1988) points out that a 
possibility to create or maintain compliance is to provide reassurance by the government. A 
government that pre-commits itself with direct democratic rules imposes itself restraints on 
its own power and thus sends a signal that taxpayers are seen as responsible persons (Torgler, 
2003). As Frey (2003) points out, taxpayers are treated as “citizens rather than subjects, and 
have extensive rights and obligations to their state”. Table 1 summarizes the empirical 
findings of selected studies in developing countries. 
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Table 1. Empirical studies on tax compliance in developing countries 
Author(s) Region & Data source Method used Findings 
Individual-based Policy-based 
D’Arcy (2011) Africa, Afrobarometer 
(2005) 
Ordered Probit Primary education (+), Female (-), 
Illiterate (-) 
Tax enforcement (+), trust (+), 
satisfaction with democracy (+), 
handling and access to: health (+) 
and education (+) 
Hug and Sporri (2011) World and Easter Europe, 
World Value Survey (WVS) 
and Europe Value Survey 
(EVS), (1995-1997) 
Orderd Probit Married(+), Age(+), female(+), 
retired(+), self-employed(-) 
Confidence in legal system(+), 
satisfaction in incumbent(+) 
Daude and Melguizo (2010) Latin America, 
Latinobarometro(LB), (2007 
& 2008) 
Probit/Orderd Probit Age(+), female(-), education(+), 
religion(-) 
Satisfaction with democracy(+), 
services(+), corruption(-) 
Levi and Sacks (2009) Africa, Afrobarometer 
(2005) 
Multi-level Logit Female(-), wealth, TV, car, radio  
(-) 
Efforts to combat corruption(+), 
enforcement of taxes(+), fair 
treatment(+), satisfaction with local 
government(+) 
Torgler (2005) Latin America and 
Carribean, WVS & LB 
(1981-1997, 1998) 
Ordered Probit Age(+), female(-), married(+), 
religion(+), financial 
satisfaction(+) 
Trust in president(+), trust in 
democracy(+), satisfaction with 
national officers(+) 
Torgler (2004) Asia, WVS (1995-1997) 
India & Japan, WVS (1981, 
1990, 1995) 
Ordered Probit Age(+), self-employed(-), 
unemployed(-), financial 
satisfaction(+) 
Trust in: government(+), in legal 
system(+), in democracy(+) 
Torgler (2003) Eastern Europe, WVS (1989-
1993, 1995-1998) 
Ordered Probit Age(+) female(+), married(+), 
self-employed(-), retired(+) 
Trust in: government(+), in legal 
system(+), in democracy(+) 
     
NB: only robust and significant results are reported. 
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4. Empirical Strategy and Data 
4.1 Model Specification 
The estimable equation is specified as shown in equation 1, following the analytical 
development by Cummings et al (2009)1.  
 
𝑇𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝐴𝑖 + 𝛿𝐵𝑖 + 𝜃𝑇𝑖 + ԑ𝑖                              (1) 
 
Where 𝑇𝐶𝑖 is tax compliant attitude. The vector 𝐴𝑖 is individual level characteristics made up 
of age, sex, education, employment status and area of residence (rural or urban). 𝐵𝑖 
encompasses vector of non-pecuniary factors (corruption of tax officials, trust in courts, trust 
in tax departments, fighting corruption, tax knowledge limitation, perceived non-compliance 
by others as well as handling health, education, road and electricity needs). Finally, 𝑇𝑖 is a 
vector of control variable for pecuniary factor (difficulty in evading tax) as well as dummy 
variables capturing country and location fixed effect whilst ԑ𝑖is the error term. 
 
4.2 Estimation Strategy 
For the purpose of this paper, the dependent variable is designed to cater for whether an 
individual is either tax compliant or not compliant. Thus the model of interest for estimation 
in equation (1) has a response variable that is binary by nature (yes/no). The application of 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) in such situation is through the use of linear probability 
model (LPM)2. However, Wooldridge (2009) noted that “The two most important 
disadvantages of LPM are that, the fitted probabilities can be less than zero or greater than 
one and the partial effect of any explanatory variable is constant”. To overcome these 
problems of estimation, the Binary Probit is adopted for this paper because Probit analysis 
developed from the need to analyse qualitative (dichotomous or polytomous) dependent 
variables within the regression framework. The Probit procedure computes maximum 
likelihood estimates of the parameters and of the probit equation. In that case, the model will 
be estimated via the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), which is a method of 
estimating the parameters of a statistical model given observations, by finding the parameter 
values that maximises the likelihood of making the observations given the parameters.  
 
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This paper used the Afrobarometer survey data Round 5 (2015) for 29 countries in SSA. 
Countries covered in this study are shown in Table A1 (see the appendix). Afrobarometer is a 
pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on 
democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in 
Africa. In order to prevent an assumed direct implication of a “wrongdoing” on the part of 
respondent, an indirectly phrased question was adopted. Respondents were asked in the 
questionnaire to state their opinion about other people who do not pay taxes they owe on their 
income. On an interval scale of 1 – 3, respondents are asked to state if they think the action of 
other people who do not pay taxes on their income is [1]“not wrong at all”, [2]“wrong but 
understandable” or [3]“wrong and punishable”. Given the response, an individual is 
regarded as having tax compliant attitude if their response is [3]“wrong and punishable’’. An 
individual is regarded as having non-compliant attitude if the response is either [1]“not wrong 
                                                             
1 Cummings et al (2009)1, modified the deterrence theory by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki 
(1974) to inculcate non-pecuniary factors that can affect tax compliance 
2 For further details on the limitations of the LPM, see Wooldridge (2009); Gujarati (2004); Agresti (1990) 
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at all” or [2]“wrong but understandable”. For the independent variables, interval scale score 
of 1 – 4 or 0 – 1 were assigned depending on responses given for variables. These responses 
were subsequently recoded into dummies. Table A2 (see the appendix) gives a formal 
definition and description of the data variables. 
 
The summary statistics indicates that about 50% of respondents are likely to comply with tax 
obligations. About 64% of respondents indicate limitation with regards to tax knowledge with 
a corresponding standard deviation of 0.479. Mean age of respondents is estimated to be 
37yrs with a minimum of 18yrs and maximum of 105yrs. A mean value of 0.506 also 
indicates that about 51% of respondents are males with 49% being females. Perceived non-
compliance by others forms about 29% of respondents with that of corruption by tax officials 
taking 36%. Also, about 61% of respondents reside in rural areas whiles about 33% of 
respondents are employed. The rest of the summary statistics of the variables is shown in 
Table A3 (see the appendix). Table A4 (see the appendix) also illustrates the Pearson 
correlation matrix for the dependent variable and independent variables for the study. 
  
5. Results and Discussions 
The empirical results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 displays results for Sub-Saharan 
Africa in general whiles Table 3 looks at the relationship of these factors on compliance from 
the legal origins perspective. Tax knowledge limitation has a negative and significant 
relationship with tax compliance in Sub-Saharan Africa as shown in Table 2. The marginal 
effect estimate means that the probability of being compliant to tax obligations decreases by 
5% if tax knowledge is perceived to be limited. This result is in line with other studies as 
Palil and Ahmad (2011), Mohamad Ali et. al., (2007), Singh (2003), Eriksen and Fallan 
(1996) and Harris (1989). In terms of legal origin as shown in Table 3, common law countries 
(British origin) has a marginal effect of 7% decrease in tax compliance if tax knowledge 
difficulty is perceived as compared to an approximately 2% decrease for civil law countries 
(French origin). 
 
Perceived non-compliance by others has a negative and significant relationship with tax 
compliance with a resulting marginal effect of reducing the compliance behaviour in Sub-
Saharan Africa by 2%. Both legal origins (British and French) countries have negative and 
significant marginal effect (2% approximately) of perceived non-compliance by others on 
probability of being tax compliant. According to Frey and Torgler, (2007), individuals 
consider tax evasion (non-compliance) to be a less serious wrongdoing the more widespread 
they presume it to be. This finding agrees with others such as Alm et al., (2017); Ho et. al., 
(2013); and Jayawardane (2016).  
 
Corruption on the part of tax officials negatively affects compliance behaviour in SSA with a 
marginal effect of about 2%. This is not surprising because it is clear that people have low 
compliance tendencies when they believe that their taxes will not go towards the provision of 
public goods or other good courses but to the pockets of corrupt public officials (Uslaner, 
2008). Levi and Sachs (2009) confirm this finding when they studied governments’ 
legitimacy to collect taxes. British legal origin countries have a marginal effect of 2% 
decrease in the probability of being compliant given a perception of tax officials being 
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Table 2. Results of non-pecuniary tax compliance determinants in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Dependent variable: Tax compliance 
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect 

















































































Country effect YES  
Region effect YES  
Weight YES  
Observations 42,641  
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.000  
NB: Tabulates are regression and marginal effect coefficient. Robust Standard errors in 
parenthesis are clustered around country. ***, **,* signifies significance level of 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. Regression include a constant term (not shown) 
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Table 3. Results of non-pecuniary tax compliance determinants in common law 
(British origin) and civil law (French origin) countries 
Dependent variable: Tax compliance 
Variable  British  French  

































































































































































Country effect YES  YES  
Regional effect YES  YES  
Weight YES  YES  
Observations 23,879  14,797  
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.000  0.000  
NB: Tabulates are regression and marginal effect coefficient. Robust Standard errors in 
parenthesis are clustered around country. ***, **,* signifies significance level of 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
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As far as institutions are concerned, perceived increase in the trust in tax department has 5% 
increase on the probability of being tax compliant in SSA. Both legal origin countries shows 
positive and significant association with a marginal impact of 4% each on the probability of 
being tax compliant given a perceived increase in trust in tax department. Trust in courts 
surprisingly has insignificant relationship both in the case of SSA and the legal origin 
countries. The extent to which government is committed to fighting corruption has positive 
and significant relationship on tax compliance in SSA with a marginal impact of 2%. This is 
also the case for both legal origin countries although the marginal effect is bigger in French 
legal origin countries (3%) than British (2%). These results on institutions confer with 
findings from studies such as Levi and Sachs (2009); Daude et al., (2013); D’Arcy (2011); 
Kogler et al., (2013). 
 
Satisfaction with public expenditures and services can serve as a measure of how well 
governments convert taxes into expenditures and that government expenditures may motivate 
compliance by providing goods and service that citizens prefer (see Torgler, 2005). This is 
confirmed with a positive and significant relationship on the probability of tax compliance 
behaviour in SSA when there is a perceived improvement in the extent to which government 
handles the provision of health, education and road (marginal effect of 2%, 3%, 2% 
respectively). From the stance of the legal origin, civil law countries has a positive and 
significant relationship on the probability of tax compliance for perceived improvement with 
respect to handling health and road needs (4% and 3% respectively). Common law countries 
has positive and significant association on compliance with respect to only handling of road 
needs (2%). 
 
6. Robustness Check 
The paper conducted a number of robustness3 checks to support the results from the baseline 
estimates. Firstly, given the responses for the tax compliance variable - [1]“not wrong at all”, 
[2]“wrong but understandable” or [3]“wrong and punishable”, it can be argued that those 
who responded [2]“wrong but understandable” may be having compliant attitude. Thus to 
cater for such cases, Ordered Probit was used to estimate the tax compliance. Secondly, in 
order to check for robustness on the dummies created for estimation, the multi-level probit is 
estimated. Thirdly, since the dependent variable is binary, an equally important estimator that 
could be used is the logistic regression. Thus the paper estimated the results using logit and 
results are presented in column 1 of Table A5 (see the appendix). Similarly, the linear 
probability model (LMP) estimator although is discussed to have limitations with regards to 
binary dependent variables, it is also used to check the robustness with results shown in 
column 2 of Table A5 (see the appendix) Furthermore, it could be argued that pooling all 
countries may produce bias estimates because there are differences with respect to 
institutional reforms, macroeconomic management among others, which can affect 
compliance behaviour differently from one country to the other. Thus the paper controlled for 
country-level factors such as GDP per capita and inflation as well as institutional reform 
indicators such as government efficiency, rule of law and regulatory quality. Results are 
displayed in columns 3 - 7 of Table A5 (see the appendix). In all the scenarios, it is seen that 
the results confirm those of the baseline, since there is no difference statistically with respect 
                                                             
3 The robustness checks shown in this paper cater for only the case of SSA as a whole. The results for the legal 
origins are not shown although they were estimated. Also, results for ordered probit and multi-level probit are 
not displayed due to space. 
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to the significance and signs of the variables – thus providing support for robustness of the 
initial results presented for analysis. 
 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper assessed the importance of non-pecuniary factors on tax compliance in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). In addition, the paper examined how legal origins affect tax 
compliance factors. Using the Round 5 of the Afrobarometer Survey data across 29 countries, 
the findings revealed that non-pecuniary factors in the form of tax knowledge limitation; non-
compliance by others; and corruption of tax officials are associated with reductions in the 
probability of tax compliance in SSA. On the contrary, factors such as trust in tax 
department; handling the provision of health, education and road needs, tend to be associated 
with increase the probability of complying with tax laws and obligations in SSA. In terms of 
legal origins, institutions and fiscal exchange have bigger association with compliance for 
common law countries (British origin) and civil law countries (French origin) respectively.  
 
The negative relationship between tax knowledge limitation and tax compliance serves as a 
basis for the revenue collection institutions in SSA to increase awareness for taxpayers with 
respect to tax matters and also as an input in the designing of tax education programs to target 
taxpayers and potential taxpayers. Having been revealed that corruption by tax officials 
discourages tax compliance, punitive action against corrupt officials can have an important 
deterrent effect. The role of the media is important in publicizing the punishment of corrupt 
officials. The least the governments in SSA could do is to continue with the provision of 
basic infrastructure/needs as health, education, roads and electricity since these have been 
evidenced to have positive effect on tax compliance. Providing such needs give taxpayers a 
feel of having back the taxes paid and are willing to comply even more. 
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Table A2: Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Tax compliance The action of people who do not pay taxes on their 
income. Measured on a scale of 1 – 3, where 1 
represents not wrong at all, 2 is wrong but 
understandable and 3 is wrong and punishable. 
Recoded as dummy of “1” if the score is 3 and “0” if 
otherwise 
Non-Pecuniary Factors  
Tax knowledge limitation Difficulty to find out what taxes to pay measured on a 
scale of 1 – 4, where 1 represents very easy, 2 is easy, 
3 is difficult  and 4 is very difficult. Recoded as 
dummy of “1” if the score is either 3 or 4 and “0” if 
the score is either 1 or 2 




The extent to which people avoid paying taxes they 
owe to the government measured on a scale of 0 – 3, 
where 0 represents never avoid, 1 represents rarely 
avoid, 2 represents often avoid and 3 is always avoid. 
Recoded as dummy of “1” if the score is either 2 or 3 
and “0” if the score is either 0 or 1 
Corruption Corruption by tax officials measured on a scale of 0-3, 
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where 0 represents none, 1 is some of them, 2 is most 
of them and 3 is all of them. Recoded as dummy of 
“1” if the score is either 2 or 3 and “0” if the score is 
either 0 or 1 
Trust in tax department To what extent do respondent trust the tax department 
measured on a scale of 0 – 3, where 0 represents not at 
all, 1 is just a little, 2 is somewhat and 3 is a lot. 
Recoded as dummy of “1” if the score is either 2 or 3 
and “0” if the score is either 0 or 1 
Trust in courts To what extent do respondent trust in the courts 
measured on a scale of 0 – 3, where 0 represents not at 
all, 1 is just a little, 2 is somewhat and 3 is a lot. 
Recoded as dummy of “1” if the score is either 2 or 3 
and “0” if the score is either 0 or 1 
Fighting corruption 
 
The extent to which government is committed to 
fighting corruption measured on a scale of 1 – 4, 
where 1 represents very badly, 2 is fairly badly, 3 is 
fairly well and 4 represents very well. Recoded as 
dummy of “1” if the score is either 3 or 4 and “0” if 
the score is either 1 or 2 
 
Health provision To what extent is the government handling the 
provision of health needs measured on a scale of 1 – 4, 
where 1 represents very badly, 2 is fairly badly, 3 is 
fairly well and 4 represents very well. Recoded as 
dummy of “1” if the score is either 3 or 4 and “0” if 
the score is either 1 or 2 
Education provision To what extent is the government handling provision 
of educational needs measured on a scale of 1 – 4, 
where 1 represents very badly, 2 is fairly badly, 3 is 
fairly well and 4 represents very well. Recoded as 
dummy of “1” if the score is either 3 or 4 and “0” if 
the score is either 1 or 2 
Road provision To what extent is government handling provision of 
roads measured on a scale of 1 – 4, where 1 represents 
very badly, 2 is fairly badly, 3 is fairly well and 4 
represents very well. Recoded as dummy of “1” if the 






To what extent is the government handling the 
provision of reliable electric supply measured on a 
scale of 1 – 4, where 1 represents very badly, 2 is 
fairly badly, 3 is fairly well and 4 represents very well. 
Recoded as dummy of “1” if the score is either 3 or 4 
and “0” if the score is either 1 or 2 




Difficulty in evading tax Difficulty to evade paying taxes measured on a scale 
of 1 – 4, where 1 represents very easy, 2 is easy, 3 is 
difficult  and 4 is very difficult. Recoded as dummy of 
“1” if the score is either 3 or 4 and “0” if the score is 
either 1 or 2 
Age Age of respondent 
Male Dummy=1 if respondent is a male 
Education The highest level of education measure on a scale of 0 
– 9, where 0 represents no formal schooling and 9 is 
postgraduate. Recoded as “1” if score is 0 or 1, “2” if 
score is 2 0r 3, “3” if score is 4 or 5 and “4” if score is 
6-9 
Rural Dummy=1 if respondent is located in a rural area 
Employment status 
Regional Fixed Effect 
Dummy=1 if respondent is employed 
 
WA Dummy=1 if respondent is located in West Africa 
EA Dummy=1 if respondent is located in East Africa 
SA Dummy=1 if respondent is located in Southern Africa 
Country-level variables  
Rule of law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. Data from World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Regulatory quality Captures perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.  Data from WGI 
 
Government effectiveness Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. Data from WGI 
GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
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any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. Data are in 
constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Data from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
Inflation Measured by the consumer price index reflects the 
annual percentage change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services 
that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, 
such as yearly. Data from WDI 
 
 
Table A3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 




Tax compliance 42,641         0.501     0.500           
Tax knowledge limitation 42,641 0.643     0.479           
Perceived non-compliance by others 42,641 0.288   0.453           
Corruption 42,641         0.363     0.481           
Trust in tax department 42,641 0.447     0.497           
Trust in courts 42,641         0.617  0.486           
Fighting corruption 42,641 0.355     0.479         
Health 42,641         0.602     0.489 
Education needs 42,641 0.629     0.483 
Roads 42,641         0.458 0.498 
Electricity 42,641 0.372     0.483 
Difficulty in avoiding tax 42,641 0.712 0.453 




42,641         
0.506 







42,641        
42,641         
0.320 
0.366 




Rural 42,641         0.614    0.487 
Employment status 42,641 0.331    0.471 




Table A4: Correlation Matrix for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 TC KN DF PNA COR TTD TIC FC HE EN RD EL AGE M EDU RUL EMP 
TC 1.00                 
KN -0.068 1.00                
DF 0.008 0.338 1.00               
PNA -0.003 -0.006 -0.035 1.00              
COR -0.035 0.081 0.042 0.077 1.00             
TTD 0.072 -0.060 0.011 -0.035 -0.178 1.00            
TIC 0.021 -0.044 -0.008 -0.065 -0.133 0.364 1.00           
FC 0.058 -0.043 -0.018 0.009 -0.098 0.174 0.154 1.00          
HN 0.058 -0.049 -0.008 -0.046 -0.066 0.109 0.134 0.248 1.00         
EN 0.058 -0.044 -0.018 -0.044 -0.063 0.115 0.134 0.223 0.535 1.00        
RD 0.079 -0.039 0.006 0.017 -0.045 0.119 0.095 0.254 0.285 0.268 1.00       
EL 0.075 -0.073 -0.010 0.019 -0.085 0.143 0.091 0.251 0.263 0.251 0.427 1.00      
AGE 0.036 -0.034 -0.003 -0.038 -0.054 0.045 0.030 -0.003 -0.022 -0.011 -0.022 -0.017 1.00     
M 0.027 0.001 0.025 0.026 0.033 0.043 0.011 0.015 -0.001 -0.008 -0.003 0.004 0.109 1.00    
EDU 0.042 -0.125 -0.076 0.103 0.064 -0.090 -0.107 -0.086 0.020 -0.008 0.060 0.060 -0.246 0.118 1.00   
RUL -0.052 0.053 0.012 -0.111 -0.032 0.019 0.072 -0.001 0.001 0.010 -0.118 -0.137 0.069 0.005 -0.333 1.00  
EMP -0.004 -0.015 0.031 0.028 0.021 0.016 0.005 -0.023 0.020 0.008 0.038 0.074 -0.005 0.116 0.246 -0.109 1.00 
TC Tax compliance 
KN Tax knowledge limitation 
DF Difficulty in avoiding tax 
PNA Perceived non-compliance by others 
COR Corruption of tax officials 
TTD Trust in tax department 
TIC Trust in courts 
FC Fighting corruption 
HN Health provision 
EN Education provision 





EMP Employment status 
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Table A5. Results for robustness checks 
Dependent variable: tax compliance 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] 
Lngdp per capita - - 0.025*** 
(0.003) 
    
Inflation - - - -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
   
Government efficiency - - - - 0.044*** 
(0.006) 
  
Rule of law - - - - - 0.025*** 
(0.006) 
 
Regulatory quality - - - - - - 0.078*** 
(0.006) 





















































































































































































































































































Regional effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Weight YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 42,641 42,641 42,641 42,641 42,641 42,641 42,641 
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NB: Tabulates are marginal effect coefficient. Robust Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered around country. ***, **,* signifies 
significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. All regressions include constant term (not shown) 
 
 
 
